China and the WTO: Moving Toward Liberalization in China\u27s Banking Sector by Lee, Wei J.
DePaul Business and Commercial 
Law Journal 
Volume 1 
Issue 3 Spring 2003 Article 7 
China and the WTO: Moving Toward Liberalization in China's 
Banking Sector 
Wei J. Lee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj 
Recommended Citation 
Wei J. Lee, China and the WTO: Moving Toward Liberalization in China's Banking Sector, 1 DePaul Bus. & 
Com. L.J. 481 (2003) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj/vol1/iss3/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. 
For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
China and the WTO:
Moving Toward Liberalization in China's Banking Sector
Wei J. Lee*
"WTO membership, for example, will require China to strengthen the
rule of law and introduce certain civil reforms, such as the publication
of rules. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
China's effort to become a member of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) was a long and arduous journey.2 With successful negoti-
ations concluding between China and member states, China's
accession was completed in early 2002. 3 Although the WTO is com-
prised of many members, few can recall when a new member has
caused such fanfare. 4
In completing the bilateral and multilateral trade agreements neces-
sary to gain membership, China has agreed to open its markets to for-
eign companies. 5 The liberalization of China's market equates to a
* DePaul University College of Law, J.D., expected May 2003; University lllinois-Urbana/
Champaign, B.A., 2000.
1. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Welcomes China, Taiwan into the
WTO (Nov. 11, 2001) (on file with the White House).
2. See Thomas Yunlong Man, Note, National Legal Recruiting in Accordance with Interna-
tional Norms: GATT/WTO and China's Foreign Trade Reform, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
471 (1997) (providing a brief history of China's withdrawal from General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and later attempt to reenter when GATT morphed into the WTO); see also
Brad L. Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the World Trade Organization: Anticipating a
United States Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 369 (2000).
3. Negotiations were completed between individual member states and also WTO's Working
Committee. See Craig S. Smith, China Braces for Impact of Membership in WTO, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/business/worldbusiness/18YUAN.
html (citing that China's accession was postponed after the September 1 th terrorist attack and
instead occurred in early 2002). See also Press Release, WTO Ministerial Conference Approves
China's Accession (Nov. 10, 2001) (announcing that China joined the WTO) (on file with the
World Trade Organization).
4. See Charles Tiefer, Sino 301: How Congress Can Effectively Review Relations with China
After WTO Accession, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 85 (2001) (asserting that including China into the
WTO will cease any leverage to combat China's human right abuses).
5. See Wayne M. Morrison, RS 20139: China and the World Trade Organization, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS, Apr. 5, 2001, available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Economics/econ-
42.cfm.
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boost in the worldwide economy. 6 Additionally, the ease of restric-
tions on certain industries means foreign corporations will have
greater access to China's one-billion-plus consumer market.7 By the
same token, the immediate impact of liberalization will affect China
greatly. 8 Unemployment will rise as China forces State Owned Enter-
prises (SOEs) to become more efficient.9 Nonetheless, if China is
able to successfully balance economic liberalization with social stabili-
zation, it will transform itself into an essential trading partner. The
exponential rise in China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)10 over the
past several years, coupled with a large consumer population base will
make China an important market to penetrate.
This paper will address the impact of China's banking industry with
its accession into the WTO. Part I will provide the necessary back-
ground to understand the current situation in China. Specifically, it
will briefly outline WTO functions and regulations. Part II will pro-
vide an overview of China's current legal framework with regards to
banking. Specifically the two banking laws -The Central Banking Law
and The Commercial Banking Law- will be examined. Part III of this
paper will discuss the ramifications of the banking laws on China's
accession to the WTO. Part IV will list suggestions to improve
China's current laws to better deal with its WTO accession. Part V
will address the impact of China's accession on the United States, and
provide suggestions for practitioners in China. The article concludes
in Part VI that China's banking industry will face a dramatic change
once it accedes to the WTO, but whether Chinese banks succeed in
the new market paradigm will depend on the flexibility of the People's
Bank of China (China's central bank).
6. Bruce Einhorn, Chester Dawson, Irene M. Kunii, Dexter Roberts, Alysha Webb & Pete
Engardio, Asia's Future China, Bus. WK., Oct. 29, 2001, at 50 (citing Deutsche Bank economist
Jun Ma who predicts that China's accession into the WTO will raise world economic growth by a
quarter percentage point within the next ten years).
7. See generally Summary of WTO-China Agreement, at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct.
9, 2001).
8. See supra note 6, at 49 (arguing that China's urban unemployment rate will rise from
around 8% to above 12% by 2002). See also Joseph Kahn, Officially, Jiang Is History; In News,
He's Still on Top, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/17/
international/asia/17CHIN.html (citing the formal regime change in China's Communist Party,
where Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as President of China).
9. Id.
10. See supra note 6.
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II. BACKGROUND
Traditionally, China's command economy has been closed to the
outside world.1' One primary explanation for this practice was based
in culture. In China, businesses and other dealings were conducted on
an ad hoc basis. Specifically, unless the individual possesses some
"quanxi" 12 or "connections," she is unlikely to obtain her objectives.
Consequently, foreign operators seeking to establish their business in
China often failed due to their lack of "quanxi. 13
Nonetheless, as globalization began to take hold, states realized the
advantages associated with bilateral and multilateral trading agree-
ments. These trading pacts allow members to import goods at prices
generally less than the price it costs them to produce. Conversely, the
member can export goods to another country where demand is higher.
The efficiency of these agreements is one main draw for states looking
to enter into trade pacts. Undeniably, the WTO is one of the largest
organizations that fosters and promotes trading among its members. 14
A. History of the WTO
The WTO came into being in 1995 after the Uruguay Round negoti-
ations in which members decided to solidify their agreement, the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), into an international
organization (WTO).15 The rules for joining the WTO were codified
in the organization's "Agreement Establishing the WTO. '' 16 The
agreement was which was signed on April 15, 1995, provided that any
state may accede to the WTO on terms negotiated between the collab-
11. See supra note 3.
12. "Quanxi" is a concept rooted in the Confucian tradition that has survived for a large part
of the Chinese culture. While quanxi was imperative to have for any successful businessperson,
its prevalence in Chinese culture has subsided since China's economy began to liberalize in the
late-1970s. See Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal Cul-
ture Perspective, I ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 13, n.61 (2000); cf. Cindy Collins, Guests, Not
Strangers... Refining the Inner "Ear" to Strengthen Global Client Ties, 18 NO. 20 OF COUNS.
14 (1999) (explaining that quanxi maintains its widespread use in China, especially with regards
to the law and lawyers. However, as China's economy liberalizes, quanxi has to yield to official
laws and regulations).
13. But see Collins, supra note 12 (explaining that quanxi has not been prevalent in China in
recent times. Instead the rule of law has become the primary guide for economic transactions).
14. See generally WTO's Goals, at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2001) (listing its
primary goal as increasing trading among its members).
15. Id. (Although the WTO came into existence in 1995, its roots was established 50 years
prior. Originally known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), GATT was
established after World War II. Under GATT, member states held a series of trade negotiations
dealing with various concerns. The negotiations ranged from anti-dumping to non-tariff mea-
sures. The latest round, known as the Uruguay Round, lead to the WTO's creation).
16. Id.
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orating parties. Decisions on accession are determined by WTO's
highest authority-the Ministerial Conference-and must be approved
by a two-thirds majority of member states. 17 Prior to approval by the
mandatory majority, negotiations over the terms of accession must be
finalized with member states.' 8 The negotiations occur on two fronts:
the first involves consultations between the WTO and the interested
party. The second front involves negotiations between the applicant
and each major trading partner. 19 Only after an applicant has passed
through all the hurdles will it become a member of the WTO. 20
B. Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
One interesting aspect of the WTO is the existence of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU), a resolution body that settles dis-
putes between member states.21 Indeed, the WTO utilizes its inde-
pendent body, through the DSU to resolve member disputes. 22 The
DSU essentially "establishes. . .a legal system that functions very
much like an international court. Moreover, it is a system that effi-
ciently administers justice. Its combination of short deadlines, quasi-
automatic procedures, and authority to issue binding decisions are
qualities that are relatively unique among international forums for set-
tling disputes. '23
17. Id.
18. See Ramona L. Taylor, Tearing Down the Great Wall: China's Road to WTO Accession, 41
IDEA 151, 154 (2001) (outlining the procedure for states to become a member in the WTO.
After a state has submitted a letter of interest and other required documents, it begins negotia-
tions by bargaining either through the General Council's Working Party or through individual
bilateral negotiations with WTO member states).
19. See supra note 4.
20. Generally, an entering member must be willing to liberalize its industries to provide a
viable framework for international competition. Although the liberalization measures are wide-
ranging, individual governments, via bi-lateral and multi-lateral negotiations, decide which in-
dustries will be opened to international competition. Once negotiations are concluded and liber-
alization has taken effect, trade between the contracting states could be made on a tariff-free
basis. See generally WTO's Website, at http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
21. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the
First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999) (showing statistics which suggest that the
US and other European countries are using WTO's DSU more often then the dispute resolution
mechanism under GATT. However, more developing countries are becoming defendants under
the WTO regime, compared to the regime established under GATT).
22. See Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade Organization: Les-
sons from the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 Micvi. J. INT'L L. 775 (1999) (providing the
history of the dispute resolution procedure that emerged from GATT).
23. Kim Van Der Borght, Book Review, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 427 (2000) (reviewing DAVID
PALMETER & PETROS C. MARVROIDIS, DISPUTE SEFTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANI-
ZATION (1999)).
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Essentially, the DSU has jurisdiction to hear appeals from all WTO
dispute resolution panels and make legal rulings on all treaties super-
vised by the WTO.24 In a sense, the DSU functions like a constitu-
tional court, elaborating and interpreting various provisions of WTO
treaties.25 However, unlike other democratic systems that utilize a
constitutional court, decisions from the DSU will unlikely become
overridden. 26
C. The Hurdle Between the US and China
Until the United States Congress passed legislation granting Perma-
nent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status to China, Congress an-
nually reviewed whether China's performance warranted the most
favored nation status (MFN).2 7 In obtaining the coveted MFN status,
China could export goods to the US at lower tariffs.2 8 Although both
China and the US have discussed China's accession into the WTO, the
US insisted that China's entry rely on "commercially meaningful
terms. '29 In essence, China's schedule toward liberalization must be
definite and within a short period of time.30
Currently, many American firms in China complain that they are
not afforded the same opportunities as their Chinese counterparts.
Specifically, they argue that China does not allow foreign firms to
penetrate the Chinese market in order to protect their domestic indus-
tries.31 The service industry, including banking and insurance, faced
even more barriers and obstacles than others-such as high technol-
ogy and machinery-because China allowed only goods and services
that were beneficial to China's economic development. 32 All other
24. See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties
in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359 (1996) (outlining the Appellate
Body's role in the WTO. Specifically, the main purpose is to craft legal opinions that interpret
WTO's main treaties).
25. See Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 451 (2001).
26. Id. (stating that a legislative override is unlikely because of the inherent nature of the
WTO setup. Since the agreements are codified in treaty form, unless the treaty itself is changed,
it is unlikely that DSU's decisions will become disobeyed).
27. See H.R. 4444, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted).
28. Id.
29. See supra note 4 (requiring China to significantly reduce trade and investment barriers
within a short time frame).
30. Id.
31. Id. China was also protecting its own industries from foreign competition. Additionally,
there are also cultural factors, such as the lack of "quanxi," which hinders a foreign company
from gaining access to the Chinese market.
32. Id.
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services that directly competed with Chinese firms faced an "extensive
array of trade barriers. '33
The latest agreements reached between China and the United
States solves the closed market dilemma. 34 In exchange for favorable
tariffs on behalf of the United States, and other member countries,
China will open its previously closed markets. 35 The comprehensive
bilateral agreement reached covers a broad range of goods and ser-
vices. 36 Nonetheless, in affording foreign firms "national treatment,"
the Chinese government must ensure equal treatment between for-
eign and domestic firms. Such policy must be especially ensured in
areas where foreign services will directly compete with domestic
services.
33. See supra note 4.
34. See supra note 21.
35. See generally Summary of WTO-China Agreement, at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct.
9, 2001).
36. See Anyuan Yuan, China's Entry into the WTO: Impact on China's Regulating Regime of
Foreign Direct Investment, 35 INT'L LAW. 195, 197-98 (outlining the highlights of China's conces-
sions with regards to foreign direct investments (FDI):
I. Performance Requirement
China will immediately eliminate all the performance requirements for FDIs, includ-
ing but not limited to, export performance requirements, local content requirements,
and requirements of mandatory transfer of technology.
2. Foreign Trade Rights
After China's accession, restrictions on foreign trade rights and distribution services
will be progressively phased out over three years.
3. Domestic Distribution and Related Services
China will liberalize wholesaling and related services within three years after acces-
sion. Restrictions on services auxiliary to distribution will also be phased out within
four years.
4. Telecommunication
China will permit FDI in telecommunication services to own up to 49 percent after
accession, and that percentage will increase to 50 percent after two years. Also,
China will gradually phase out all geographic restrictions within six years.
5. Banking
China will allow 100 percent foreign ownership of banking entities starting five years
after accession. Foreign banks will be allowed to conduct local currency business
with Chinese enterprises starting two years after accession, with Chinese individuals
starting five years after accession.
6. Insurance
China will allow foreign companies to own up to 50 percent in life insurance compa-
nies after accession, and branching or wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries for non-life
insurance within two years. Further, China will expand the scope of business for
foreign investors to include group, health, and pension. All geographic limitation
will be eliminated within three years.
7. Securities
China will permit minority foreign-owned joint ventures to engage in fund manage-
ment on the same terms as Chinese firms. In addition, 33 percent of foreign-owned
ventures will be allowed to underwrite domestic equity and debt issues).
CHINA AND THE WTO
D. Implications of U.S.-China WTO Agreement
China's accession to the WTO carries several important ramifica-
tions for the U.S.-China economic relations. First, since China has
been granted PNTR status, Congress could no longer vote annually on
China's trade status, which could help bring greater stability and pre-
dictability to the trade relationship.37 Second, the United States and
China will be able to use the WTO dispute resolution process to re-
solve trade disputes, rather than relying on unilateral threats of trade
sanctions (prevalent especially over human rights issues).38 Third,
subjecting China's trade regime to multilateral rules means that the
United States would no longer have to unilaterally force China to
open its markets; other WTO members would also have stakes in en-
suring China's compliance. 39 Finally, China's accession to the WTO
would likely improve the business climate in China, leading to greater
trade and investment opportunities for U.S. firms.40
By the same token, many analysts express concerns about the Chi-
nese government's willingness to fully implement WTO obligations
once it obtains membership. 41 Commentators note that corruption
and local protectionism are rampant in China, and government bu-
reaucrats that oversee various industries could prove difficult in the
short term.42 Some analysts warn that these disruptions might erode
the government's determination to fully implement their WTO com-
mitments, especially if fears of social instability are realized. 43
III. CHINA'S CURRENT BANKING LAWS
A. China's Banking Industry and the WTO: An Overview
Finalized negotiations between the WTO and China have paved the
way for China's accession to the WTO. 44 The negotiations yielded a
37. See supra note 4.
38. See supra note 24 (outlining the process in which member states are to resolve their dis-
putes. The disputes are referred to a committee in which the disputes are resolved via internal
mechanism rather then seeking a resolution outside of the organization).
39. Id.
40. See supra note 4.
41. See Taylor, supra note 18, at 157 (pointing out that the Chinese market is still masked in
secretiveness, and although provincial leaders and business regulators have been educated on
the implications of the WTO, their willingness to accommodate WTO regulations at the cost of
unemployment from displaced state-owned enterprises remains uncertain).
42. See Yuan, supra note 36, at 217 (asserting that local protectionism in China is prevalent
and notorious).
43. See supra note 4.
44. See supra note 2. Indeed, China successfully became a member of the WTO in 2002. See
WTO Website, at http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
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timetable to integrate China into the global community. Generally,
the agreements require China to open access to markets previously
closed to foreign investors.45 Specifically, the banking sector is to be-
come fully open within five years of accession. 46 In the meantime,
however, the liberalization of China's banking sector will occur in
three phases. 47 First, upon accession, foreign financial institutions will
be permitted to provide services in China without client restrictions
for foreign currency businesses. 48 Secondly, within two years of acces-
sion, foreign financial institutions will be permitted to provide local
currency business services to Chinese enterprises. 49 During the last
phase, occurring within five years of accession, foreign financial insti-
tutions will be permitted to provide unrestricted financial services to
all Chinese clients. 50
Currently, China's banking reform has been moving at a slow pace.
Although improvements have been made, Chinese banks will have a
difficult time competing with foreign banks once liberalization fully
takes affect.51 Aside from inefficiency, the government's dominance
over the Chinese banking system remains high. According to one
commentator:
Chinese banks are operated more like an administrative agency
than a commercial enterprise; banks operate in the red with signifi-
cant government subsidies. Some 70% of Chinese bank loans go to
the state sector, producing only 34% of total output. In the PRC
there are low loan rejection rates and high bad loan rates, despite
the requirement that commercial banks conduct a searching inquiry
of the borrower's purpose, collateral, and ability to repay. 52
Although such commentary suggests that China's banking future re-
mains bleak, it fails to factor China's motivation for joining the WTO.
Where China does have problems with its banking industry, it must
correct those mistakes to be a viable competitor once the industry be-
comes open to foreign competition. Following the adage, "sink or
45. See WTO Website, at http://www.wto.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2002) (outlining the basic
agreement that China must abide by).
46. Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Economic Forum on China's Banking Industry
(listing the schedule China must abide by with regards to the banking industry), available at
http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/sc/991203.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2002) [Hereinafter Hong
Kong Trade].
47. Id. See also Qian, infra note 63.
48. See Qian, infra note 63.
49. See Morrison, supra note 5.
50. Hong Kong Trade, supra note 46.
51. Id. (arguing "the inability of the banking system to allocate the country's capital efficiently
is arguably one of the most serious problems of the country's economic infrastructure").
52. Michael E. Burke, IV, Improving China's Bank Regulation to Avoid the Asian Bank Con-
tagion, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32 (1999).
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swim" China must ensure that certain practices 53 cease immediately to
avoid sinking. Although China will have to address all of their issues
in turn, the examination of China's banking laws becomes a crucial
starting point.
B. Current Legal Framework in China
The major problem China faces with its service sector is the lack of
a legal framework.5 4 Under the WTO agreement, the WTO member
must "administer published laws in an uniform, impartial and reasona-
ble manner. ' 55 In China, the current legal system lacks the necessary
transparency required by WTO rules. To a large extent, the imple-
mentation of laws and regulations relies on the discretion of bureau-
crats.56 Compounding the problem, interpretations by judicial bodies
of Chinese laws and regulations do not have legal precedent on later
cases.57 Although Chinese laws are documented, they are sometimes
opaque, and are often ambiguous. 58 The ambiguity of Chinese laws
are further complicated since provincial branches of the government
may interpret laws differently than the Beijing administration.
The underlying issue facing China's legal system involves the lack of
uniformity. China does not have an official compilation of laws and
regulations. 59 Instead, periodical publications are sometimes com-
plied. Even so, China has taken steps toward streamlining laws to en-
sure accurate compliance. In anticipation of its accession into the
global market place, China has taken steps to clarify its laws and regu-
lations. Specifically, the banking sector has benefited from early re-
form. Although the reform began in the 1980s and stretched into the
53. Specifically practices such as forcing banks to make loans to failing SOEs must be
stopped.
54. See Yuan, supra note 36 (asserting that China's laws are too transparent, and need to
become more clear as China accedes to the WTO).
55. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, art. XVII(1) [hereinafter GAT'].
56. See Taylor, supra note 18 (In order to prevent discretion over WTO rules, the Chinese
leadership brought provincial and business leaders to learn about the WTO). See also Yuan,
supra note 36.
57. See Yuan, supra note 36.
58. See China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, at http://www.
moftec.gov.cn/moftec en/flfg..en.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2001) (China's Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation website outlining the different laws and regulations that exist
in China).
59. See Yuan, supra note 36, at 217 (stating that China's current legal system lacks trans-
parency for several reasons. First, the laws are too generalized, and therefore leave a great deal
of discretion to career bureaucrats. Second, China lacks the compilation of laws and regulations.
Lastly, there are no official compilations for local rules and regulations).
2003]
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1990s, only two substantive banking laws were passed.60 They are: the
Central Banking Law and the Commercial Bank Law.6'
C. China's Current Banking Laws
China's attempt in conforming their banking industry to interna-
tional standards is commendable. Indeed, it is one of the few sectors
that have codified statutes into compilation form. Although the laws
establish the necessary framework to commence banking practices,
there are also some ambiguities inherent in the laws. In order to ad-
dress those issues, the two substantive banking laws will first be
outlined.
1. The Central Banking Law62
The Central Banking Law established the People's Bank of China
(PBOC) as China's central bank and promulgates certain responsibili-
ties for the PBOC.63 The central bank is charged with three major
responsibilities: "making and implementing national monetary policy,
exercising supervision and administration over financial institutions,
and maintaining the stability of the official currency-Renminbi yuan
(RMB). ' 64 As the central bank, the PBOC was "established to for-
mulate and implement the government's monetary policies as well as
60. Although China's banking reform officially started in the late 1970s, both of the substan-
tive banking laws came into existence only in the mid-1990s.
61. See http://www.chinahouston.org/economy/English/Financial andBanking-System.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2001) (listing the relevant banking laws passed by the Chinese government,
and providing a brief history of China's banking reform legislation).
62. See LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA
(China) (establishing the PBOC as China's central bank. The law contains seven chapters and
fifty-one articles outlining the responsibilities of the bank) [hereinafter CENTRAL BANKING
LAW].
63. Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Transforming China's Traditional Banking Systems Under the New
National Banking Laws, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 479 (1996) (outlining the major historical
developments in China's banking reform).
64. See CENTRAL BANKING LAW art. 4 (1995) (China). Specifically, the bank performs twelve
main functions: 1) formulating and implementing monetary policies; 2) issuing Renminbi and
managing the circulation of Renminbi; 3) examining the establishment of financial institutions
and exercising regulation over them; 4) regulating financial markets; 5) issuing orders and rules
and regulations concerning the regulation and operation of financial industry; 6) holding manag-
ing and operating state foreign exchange reserve and gold services; 7) operating state treasury; 8)
safeguarding the normal operation of payment and clearing system; 9) responsible for financial
statistics, investigation, analysis and forecasting; 10) engaging in financial operations; 11) engag-
ing in international financial operations; and 12) handling other matters as entrusted by the State
Council. See also People's Bank of China, at http://ce.cei.gov.cn/echn/al/cal02pbc.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 2002) (People's Bank of China website, listing the main functions of the PBOC).
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exercise supervision and administration of the financial industry under
the leadership of the State Council. '65
One important aspect of the PBOC is its relative autonomy. Al-
though the PBOC must answer to the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People's Congress,66 it is free from interference from other
governmental authorities. The PBOC is charged to make lawful and
independent implementation of monetary policy, fulfilling its respon-
sibilities and business operations. 67 As optimistic as initial reports
suggest, PBOC's autonomy carry an important caveat: the Standing
Committee still oversees the PBOC. Since the Chinese government is
based on a hierarchical system, it stands to reason that the Standing
Committee could pressure the PBOC to implement regulations which
it deems "necessary" at the cost of the PBOC's autonomy. Whether
the Standing Committee will exert such pressures will be evident in
due time.
2. The Commercial Banking Law
One of China's most comprehensive banking legislations, the Com-
mercial Banking Law contains nine chapters and covers ninety-one
articles.68 The Commercial Banking Law's primary intent was to es-
tablish a standardized system for banks in China to operate. 69 Such
standardization provides banks with the necessary framework:to oper-
ate autonomously. 70 By shifting fiscal responsibility to the banks, the
Commercial Banking Law acts as an impetus for bank liberalization. 71
Specifically, banks now must create innovative products and programs
65. See CENTRAL BANKING LAW art. 2 (1995) (China) (stating: "The People's Bank of China is
the central bank of the People's Republic of China. The People's Bank of China shall, under the
leadership of the State Council, formulate and implement monetary policies and exercise supervi-
sion and control over the banking industry) (emphasis added).
66. CENTRAL BANKING LAW art. 6 (1995).
67. CENTRAL BANKING LAW art. 7 (1995).
68. COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW (1995) (China) (covering a vast array of banking services
that protect "the legitimate rights and interests of commercial banks, depositors and other cli-
ents, standardize the behavior of commercial banks, improve the quality of funds, strengthen
supervision and administration, ensure security and soundness in commercial banking, maintain
normal financial order and promote the development of the socialist market economy"). Id. art.
1.
69. Id. art. 1.
70. Qian, supra note 63, at 488 (describing that commercial banks should now rely on self-
operation, self-risk management, self-responsibility for profits or losses, and self restraint). See
also COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW art. 4 (stating: "a commercial bank operates independently,
assumes responsibility for all risks it may encounter and for the profits and looses belonging
thereto it may bear on its own, and exercises self-regulating mechanisms on the management
principles of economic efficiency, safety and liquidity ... ) (emphasis added).
71. Wang Sheng Ming & Feng Wang, P.R.C Gets Its First Commercial Bank Law, 17 NO. 10
E. Asian Executive Rep. 9 (1995) (stating that in the past, commercial banks' autonomy were
20031
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to compete for customers. Also, corporate governance will be crucial
as customers will be attracted to banks, which not only offer great
products and services, but also provide a safe haven for their savings.
Recognizing the liberalization effect of the Commercial Banking
Law, the drafters wanted to ensure transparency in its provisions. In-
deed, the Commercial Banking Law is divided into Chapters that deal
with specific issues.72 While the law provides a general understanding
of requisite documentation and fiscal implementation obligations,73
there are also provisions which seem to dilute the straightforwardness
of the law's provisions.74 For example Article 8 of the Commercial
Banking Law states: "A commercial bank shall abide by the relevant
provisions of the law and administrative decrees and regulations in its
business activities and shall not infringe upon the interests of the State
or the public. '75 Since the state determines its own interests, the pro-
vision allows the government sweeping authority to categorize any-
thing to be "against the state's interest." Article 8, potentially,
provides the ammunition necessary to subjectively punish a commer-
cial bank for its failure to obey any governmental agency. Such power
remains too broad and could succumb to abuse by unscrupulous gov-
ernment officials.
D. Effects of the Two Banking Laws on China's Banking Industry
In the long run, the two banking laws will undoubtedly have a posi-
tive effect on China's banking industry. Establishing the PBOC as an
independent central bank with the powers to regulate the banking sec-
tor will be extremely beneficial to China. What complicates the issue
is the timeframe imposed on this sector with its accession to the WTO.
For all intent and purposes, the timeframe in which Chinese banks
needs to completely adapt to the laws' liberalization policies will be
within the next five years. 76 Once foreign competition has full access
disregarded by local government agencies. These agencies would order banks to issue loans to
companies that were in bad financial shape).
72. COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW (1995) (China) (The Chapters deal with a vast array of is-
sues, from the protection of depositors (Chapter III), to Basic Principles for Loans and Other
Businesses (Chapter IV) and Legal Liabilities (Chapter Viii)).
73. Id. art. 13 (requiring a minimum registered capital for the establishment of a commercial
bank to be one billion Yuan. An urban cooperative commercial bank needs to register a mini-
mum of 100 million Yuan of capital. A rural cooperative commercial bank needs a minimum
registered capital of 50 million Yuan to become an established bank).
74. See id. art. 8.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 36 (outlining the timetable in which China will allow foreign banks to
compete in China. Specifically, all restrictions on foreign banks will be phased out after 5 years).
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to the Chinese market, they could potentially erase half of China's
banking share.77
In order to prevent a large migration to foreign banks of its corpo-
rate and individual customers, China will need to address several
problems:
1. State Dominance in Banks
Currently the banking industry is dominated by four state-owned
commercial banks.78 These banks are: Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China,
and the People's Construction Bank of China. 79 Together the four
banks account for 70% of banking sector's deposits and loans.80 Al-
though these banks have a large percentage of China's banking busi-
nesses, commentators have argued that they need to be more selective
in their lending practices, and to improve their efficiency. 81 Addition-
ally, the banks infrastructure will have to be upgraded as the banks
compete with foreign firms whom possess the latest technology.
2. PBOC Autonomy
Although the PBOC retains its autonomy as the central bank of
China, it is still affected by the political tentacles of the Standing Com-
77. See Banks Dancing to WTO Tune, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 12, 2002 (quoting Frank Kolhatkar
of the accounting firm Deloitte & Touche: "Chinese banks will face fierce competition from
foreign counterparts and may face the loss of their market share, large clients and qualified
employees"), available at www.china.org.cn/english/26850.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2002). See
also Smith, supra note 3 (quoting China's prime minister, Zhu Rongji at a gathering of private
businessmen in Nanjing, "Friends, you clap, but even I don't yet know how big the competition is
that we'll face after we enter the WTO . .. My heart isn't yet very settled." The article also
estimates that China's banks could lose as much as half of the market to foreign competition),
available at htt://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/business/worldbusiness/18YUAN.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 2002).
78. See Qian, supra note 63, at 482-84 (distinguishing the four "specialized banks" in China.
When the PBOC was established as a central bank, its lending practices were separated into four
different banks. Although the four banks were technically autonomous, they were still under
government control and carried out special responsibility in its own field. The banks were de-
scribed as: "a socialist multi-level financial system with Chinese characteristics ... with the cen-
tral bank as its core and specialized state banks as its main body, and with co-existing diversified
forms of financial organization.") (quoting the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Information
China 633 (1988)).
79. Id.
80. See Qian, supra note 63 (stating that about 70% of the banking sector's deposits could be
accounted by the four state-owned banks).
81. Id. See also supra note 71 (commenting that Chinese banks are run more like governmen-
tal administrative agencies instead of private business enterprises). Additionally, the issue of
bad loans remains a major concern for the PBOC. One PBOC governor estimated that the
problem loans stand at twenty percent of the major commercial banks total revenue. Peter
Montagnon, Bad Loans at Chinese Banks Total 20%, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at 7.
494 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
mittee. Because the Standing Committee appoints the governor of
the PBOC, there is a danger that the appointment will be based on
political connections rather then experience. 82 One major concern is
that career politicians rather then qualified economists, will make
complicated monetary decisions. 83 Such a scenario would prove detri-
mental to China's credibility in the WTO.
Additionally, the Chinese government's influence over the PBOC
remains unclear. 84 Although the PBOC is "autonomous," the separa-
tion between the central bank and the government could be extended.
3. Role of State Owned Enterprises (SOE)
As China liberalizes, it must shed inefficient and unprofitable state
owned enterprises (SOEs).8 5 One problem associated with such ac-
tion stems from the large number of workers employed by the
SOEs.86 A recurring pressure placed on the central government in
Beijing is to keep SOE employees working to assure social stability.8 7
In order to ensure that SOEs are able to stay financially afloat, the
Chinese government has, in the past, pressured banks to make unwise
loans to failing SOEs.88
As liberalization takes hold, the government could pressure state
owned commercial banks to lend money to the ailing industries. Such
a scenario could jeopardize many sectors in China's economy. It
would be best to allow those ailing industry to succumb to market
pressures and either merge or declare bankruptcy. Of course, one im-
portant factor to keep in mind involves the displaced Chinese work-
82. To China's credit, it has selected qualified individuals to head the PBOC. The current
governor, Dai Xianglong, has extensive experience in the banking industry, and was trained as
an accountant. Nonetheless, the possibility of politics clouding the judgment of the Standing
Committee remains a threat. See generally CENTRAL BANKINc LAW art. 9 (1995) (China) (out-
lining the election process for PBOC's governor. The governor is nominated by the Premier of
the State Council and approved by the National People's Congress. However, if the Congress is
not in session, the governor will be decided by the Standing Committee and appointed or re-
moved by the President of the People's Republic of China. Additionally, the premier of the
State Council appoints the deputy governors).
83. Qian, supra note 63 (stating that although the Central Banking Law, which established the
PBOC, forbids government authorities at any level to interfere with PBOC's implementation of
monetary policies, there is a danger of provincial interference. Specifically, since the PBOC is
administered through its headquarters in Beijing and local provincial or municipal government,
interference could exist).
84. See id.
85. China has already attempted to close down inefficient and unprofitable SOEs.
86. See Michael E. Burke, IV, China's Stock Markets and the World Trade Organization, 30
LAw & POLY INT'l Bus. 321 (1999) (suggesting that the failure of SEO reforms could expose
roughly seventy million Chinese SOE employees to unemployment).
87. Id.
88. See Bacon, supra note 2, at 430.
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ers. 89  Such a predicament places a heavy burden on the
government.90 China's liberalization progress must be balanced with
wise financial decisions and the resulting potential social unrest from
unemployment pressures. Such delicate balance will take much effort
and planning.
IV. ANALYSIS - SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE CHINA'S
BANKING SECTOR
Becoming a member of the WTO, China's actions will have interna-
tional ramifications. Therefore, the international community will
carefully scrutinize China's actions. After all, member states of the
WTO are involved in the organization for mutual benefit. 91 Should
their expectations fail to materialize due to inadequate market condi-
tions, members will apply diplomatic pressure to ensure that liberali-
zation takes full effect. Additionally international members are able
to utilize the dispute resolution mechanism, through the WTO body,
to ensure compliance. 92
A. Problems Revisited
1. State Dominance in Banks
Currently, four state-owned banks dominate the Chinese commer-
cial-bank sector. 93 After five years of WTO membership, China will
open its banking market without restrictions. 94 Given China's large
corporate and consumer base, there will undoubtedly be a large influx
89. See Burke, supra note 86.
90. Id.
91. Indeed, each member state independently negotiates with the acceding member on tariffs
and obligations. Thus, the "agreement" reached are really independent agreements bilaterally
negotiated between states. See generally WTO Accessions: The Mandate, at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/acce/acc7_3_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2001) (citing the Marrakesh agree-
ment establishing the WTO. The provisions are as follows:
1. Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of
its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement,
on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto.
2. The Ministerial Conference shall take decisions on accession. The Ministerial Con-
ference shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds ma-
jority of the Members of the WTO).
92. Dispute Resolution Mechanism is an option to be utilized by WTO members to settle
disputes among its members. See generally Movsesian infra note 126.
93. See Qian, supra note 63 (stating that foreign competition could erode China's market
share by 50%).
94. See Yuan, supra note 36.
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of foreign banks. 95 Basic economic theory of competition dictate that
the opening of the banking sector will erode the market share of Chi-
nese banks. 96
With liberalization, both foreign and new domestic banks will have
to first comply with the Commercial Banking Law, as well as China's
Company Law.97 These laws will have to be carefully studied prior to
entry. Additionally, the dominant Chinese banks will have to reor-
ganize its internal structure to ensure compliance with the Commer-
cial Banking Law. 98 Specifically, the Chinese banks will have to refer
to the PBOC for clear guidance on monetary and economic
regulations. 99
At this liberalization juncture, domestic Chinese commercial banks
should take advantage of the Commercial Banking Law. Although
four banks dominate the banking sector, these banks have not com-
plied with the Commercial Banking Law. Indeed, the Law contains
exemptions for large state banks from compliance for a certain period
of time. 100 Chinese banks, possessing a large capital reserve and in-
corporated under the Commercial Banking Law, could reap the most
benefit. These banks have a jump on foreign banks since they at least
95. See Huo Yongzhe, Move to Pudong, SHANGHAI STAR, Feb. 29, 2000, at http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/star/history/00-02-29/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2002) (citing Ma Jia'nan, deputy di-
rector of the Economic Adjustment Division under the Pudong Comprehensive Planning Com-
mission, who expects an influx of foreign banks as China enters the WTO).
96. See BRADLEY SCHILLER, THE MACRO ECONOMY TODAY (8th ed. 2000).
97. The Commercial Banking Law does cite the Company Law. Both laws, in particular, gov-
ern banks. See CHINA'S COMPANY LAW (1994) (China).
98. See Qian, supra note 63, at 492 (stating that banking institutions and also credit unions are
not tp to the standards established in the Commercial Banking Law).
99. See COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW arts. 10-12 (1995) (China) (the law provides the follow-
ing provisions:
Article 10: A commercial bank shall be subject to supervision and administration by the
People's Bank of China pursuant to the law.
Article 11: The establishment of a commercial bank shall require the examination and
approval of the People's Bank of China. No organization or individual shall receive
deposits of money form the public, engage in any other activities of a commercial bank,
or use the title of "bank" without the approval of the People's Bank of China.
Article 12: The establishment of a commercial bank shall satisfy the following
requirements:
(1) Its statute shall be pursuant to this law and the Company Law of the People's
Republic of China.
(2) It shall possess the minimum registered capital defined by this law;
(3) Chair of the Board of Directors (president), general manager and other senior
managerial personnel with expertise and professional experience required by their
positions shall be appointed.
(4) Organization and management shall be complete;
(5) Business site, safety measures and other facilities relevant with the business thereof
shall all be up to standard).
100. See Qian, supra note 63.
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have some experience with the law, and contain a certain level of cus-
tomer base.
As China's accession agreements begin to materialize, these Chi-
nese banks need to take a more aggressive approach. Aside from
aforementioned customer service and infrastructure improvements,
these banks must also begin to establish name recognition. Advertis-
ing will play a key role as banks differentiate themselves before the
arrival of foreign firms. 1°" Initially, Chinese commercial banks must
expand its customer base. Corporate and individual consumers must
be made aware of the innovative services offered by the bank.
Although an aggressive approach should prove beneficial, one fac-
tor to keep in mind deals with China's size and people. Due to the
vast differences that undoubtedly occur with any large populations, it
would be advisable for Chinese commercial banks to regionalize their
operations. Instead of offering a vast array of services over all of
China, banks-both domestic and foreign-should concentrate on one
region. Banks must tailor their products and services to the needs of
the designated region. Smaller commercial banks could even consider
specializing within the needs of one particular city.
2. PBOC Autonomy
Success of China's entry into a liberalized banking sector will heav-
ily depend on the PBOC's ability to promulgate decisive laws and reg-
ulations. However, China will have to ensure that PBOC retains its
autonomy from the Standing Council of the Chinese government.102
One of the most worrisome aspects of the PBOC revolves around
their authority to promulgate rules. 10 3
In order for China to strive toward liberalization, the PBOC must
be able to maintain its autonomy. For example, the governors of the
central bank must be qualified economists familiar with policy initia-
tives employed under various market conditions. Cash flow, interest
rates, inflation and other monetary policies are some of the problems
the PBOC will encounter. The interest rate, specifically, should be
further liberalized to conform to market conditions. 10 4 The staff, too,
must be qualified to analyze the market conditions to provide an accu-
101. Some foreign firms have already established joint venture, and other partnerships with
Chinese banks prior to the WTO agreement.
102. See Burke, supra note 52, at 60 (stating that "jurisdictional lines between financial au-
thorities are unclear, especially regarding potential conflicts between the PB[O]C and the State
Council Securities Commission over securities regulation").
103. Id.
104. Dai Xianglong, Governor of the People's Bank of China, China's Financial Industry at
the Threshold of the 21st Century, Address at Stanford University (Oct. 17, 2000), in PBOC's
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rate and immediate feedback to their superiors. One solution is for
the PBOC to establish different branches to perform specific func-
tions.' 05Although the proceeding suggestions seem basic, one must re-
member that the PBOC continues to be heavily influenced by the
government's Standing Committee.10 6 The Standing Committee could
appoint career politicians, rather then qualified individuals to posts
within the PBOC. In order for the PBOC to be independent from the
government, and especially the Standing Committee, it must avoid its
inclination to appoint an unqualified politician.
Appointments to the PBOC will be only the first step toward bank-
ing liberalization. The next step will be for the Standing Committee to
further distance itself from the PBOC. One solution is to make the
central bank's operations more transparent, and provide more of a
detailed guidance for the PBOC. 10 7 The PBOC must possess the abil-
ity to unilaterally form committees in dealing with various market fac-
tors. 0 8 Such measure should ensure the banks autonomy from undue
influence from the Standing Committee.
3. Role of SOE
One potential problem with China's liberalization process is the
role of China's SOE. China will undoubtedly try to protect their SOE
website, available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/speeches/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2002) (gover-
nor Xianglong addressed the liberalization of the PBOC and its interest rate policy:
The interest rates of deposits and loans are, however, still decided by the central bank,
which does not seem appropriate. In the coming years, therefore, China will enhance its
reform efforts of interest rate liberalization. The steps of the reform are as follows: (i)
Beginning September 2000, China has decontrolled the interest rates of deposits and
loans in foreign currencies. (ii) The interest rates of deposits and loans of rural financial
institutions are expected to approach those for private borrowing and lending. (iii) The
band of lending rate for urban financial institutions is expected to enlarge and flexible
management will be imposed on the interest rate of deposits. Finally, the central bank
should be able to rely on the open market operations to adjust the level of interest
rates. Third, China will implement a comprehensive reform of its wholly state-owned
commercial banks according to the principles of modern banking).
105. See CENTRAL BANKING LAW art. 12 (1995) (China) (allowing the PBOC to establish
branches as representative organs. These organs can be responsible for supervision and the han-
dling of other businesses under the auspices of the PBOC).
106. See Burke, supra note 52, at 57 (arguing that political influence in banking operations of
Chinese banks prevent the PBOC from promulgating rules objectively).
107. See Burke, supra note 52, at 59 (stating that the 1993 reforms of the PBOC made opera-
tions more confusing since there was no clear guidance to pursue the new rules. Also, there was
weak regulatory oversight on commercial banks, which could make a system-wide failure of the
Chinese banking-sector possible).
108. Factors such as inflation, interest rates, and other monetary policies should be compart-
mentalized within the PBOC.
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interests. 109 In the short term, it is likely that unemployment will rise
in China as foreign competition enters China. 10 Additionally, estab-
lished Chinese firms could continue to purchase their inventory from
other Chinese firms with whom they have quanxi."' The culmination
of these factors could force the Chinese government to provide
unadvisable loans to inefficient companies. 112
Although such bleak scenario seems unlikely, there are internal
procedures China must take to avoid this type of catastrophe. With
the SOEs, China should err on the side of liberalization. Although
unemployment will rise in the short term, if the markets become liber-
alized as planned, foreign competition will offset any domestic failure.
Unemployment will eventually subside as foreign firms begin to hire
more domestic workers.1 13
C. Recommendations
The forgoing discussion involved the internal dynamics surrounding
the Chinese banking industry. This section will focus on specific rec-
ommendations for China to adopt. Aside from PBOC autonomy,
China will have to revise- or clarify -certain provisions listed in the
Chinese Banking Law. Lastly, there are measures, via the Dispute
109. See Craig S. Smith, Chinese See Pain as Well as Profit in New Trade Era, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2000, at Al (asserting that SOEs in China are not yet ready for foreign competition).
110. Id.
111. See Peng, supra note 12 (explaining that quanxi, or connections, were prevalent in Chi-
nese business dealings).
112. See The White House Office of Public Liaison, Briefing on the Clinton Administration
Agenda for the World Trade Organization Material, Summary of U.S.-China Bilateral WTO
Agreement (Nov. 17, 1999), at http://www.uschina.org/public/991115a.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2002) (stating that "China has agreed that it will ensure that state-owned and state-invested
enterprises will make purchases and sales based solely on commercial considerations, such as
price, quality, availability and marketability, provide U.S. firms with the opportunity to compete
for sales and purchases on non-discriminatory terms and conditions"). See also Bacon, supra
note 2, at 430 (discussing the Chinese government's influence in extending loans to failing SOEs.
Bacon suggests that such assistance amounts to a form of indirect subsidy).
113. Who Won in the WTO Deal: Membership Will Help Change China's Society - and the
WTO Itself, ASIA WK., Dec. 3, 1999, available at http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/
99/1203/ed.wto.winner.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002) (stating:
The increased competition Chinese industries will feel from the influx of more foreign
imports and deeper foreign investment will become the acid test for coddled industries.
Those that can meet the challenge will ultimately survive and prosper. Many others will
fail to navigate in the new climate. The expected business expansion as investors build
up competing ventures should in time help create new jobs to absorb displaced work-
ers, including many in the farming sector, as well as providing new opportunities for the
countless younger workers who will be coming of age).
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Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO, to pursue by foreign
governments to ensure WTO compliance.14
1. The Commercial Banking Law
China's Banking Law provides a provision that lists the minimum
registered capital required for establishing a commercial bank.115 The
requirements list a specific amount of capital needed for commercial
banks, urban cooperative commercial banks, and rural cooperative
commercial banks. 116 Although the Commercial Banking Law lists
the required paid-up capital, it does not mention the minimum opera-
tional capital needed for a commercial bank to continue operation. 1 7
In order to ensure proper corporate governance, the Commercial
Banking Law should be amended to include a provision which states
the minimum amount of capital needed to maintain a banking license.
Such amendment would force individual commercial banks to comply
with lending provisions listed in the Commercial Banking Law. 1 8 In
particular, banks will have the added incentive to provide proper cor-
porate governance and ensure that all corporate businesses are prop-
erly documented. Additionally, banks must invent innovative
products and provide excellent customer service to make sure that
their operational capital will not dip below the minimum threshold.
Aside from amending Article 13 to require minimum operational
capital, the PBOC also must clarify the second half of the article. The
second paragraph of Article 13 states that the PBOC "may readjust
the floor amount of the registered capital necessary for the establish-
ment of a commercial bank in consideration of economic develop-
114. See Hudec, supra note 21 (showing statistics which suggest that US and other European
countries are using WTO's DSU more often then the dispute resolution mechanism under
GATT. However, more developing countries are becoming defendants under the WTO regime,
compared to the regime established under GATT).
115. See COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW art. 13 (1995) (China).
116. See id.
Article 13: The minimum registered capital for the establishment of a commercial bank
shall be one billion yuan (RMB 1,000,000,000). An urban cooperative commercial
bank shall need a minimum registered capital of 100 million yuan (RMB 100,000,000)
and a rural cooperative commercial bank shall need a minimum registered capital of 50
million yuan (RMB 50,000,000). The registered capital referred to herein should be
paid-up capital.
The People's Bank of China may readjust the floor amount of the registered capital
necessary for the establishment of a commercial bank in consideration of economic
development, but the amount shall not be lower than those specified in the previous
paragraph.
Id.
117. See id. arts. 20-23 (listing the license approval process and the time-frame in which the
bank license must be used before expiration).
118. See id. art. 4.
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ment, but the amount shall not be lower than those specified in the
previous paragraph." 1 9 The provision seems ambiguous and confus-
ing. Indeed, several questions need to be addressed by the PBOC to
clarify the ambiguity and confusion. First, the ambiguity occurs with
PBOC's ability to readjust the minimum amount necessary to main-
tain bank operations. What type of discretion will the PBOC have
with regards to this issue? Secondly, the confusion occurs with the
statement that the "amount shall not be lower than those specified in
the previous paragraph.' 20 How can the PBOC readjust the floor
requirements when the amount cannot be lower then the previous
paragraph? 12' The PBOC must clarify this contradiction.
However, in order to maintain equality between all commercial
banks, the PBOC should not make exceptions, and lower the floor for
the paid-up capital.
2. The PBOC
Ensuring compliance will require the PBOC to develop a task force.
Documentation will become key, as PBOC staff reviews individual
bank's capital statements. 22 These reviews should occur regularly.
Aside from motivating banks to develop products, continued PBOC
review would reassure corporate and individual consumers that banks
in China are a safe haven for their investments.
Additionally, the central government must promulgate certain en-
forcement mechanisms for the PBOC. Under the Central Banking
Law, the PBOC's mandate ambiguously states: "exercise supervision
and control over banking institutions and their business operations to
maintain the legitimate, stable and sound operation of the banking
industry.' 23 Although the Central Banking Law does list activities
punishable by fines or jail time, the list only pertains to criminal activi-
ties involving the RMB. 124 Instead, the PBOC need to possess an en-
forcement mechanism involving commercial banks failure to obey
PBOC regulations. Similar to the criminal list established, the Central
Banking Law should include provisions listing fines applicable to vari-
119. See COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW art. 13 (1995) (China).
120. Id.
121. See supra note 116 (listing the entire provision of Article 13).
122. See CENTRAL BANKING LAW art. 33 (1995) (China) (providing that the PBOC "shall have
the power to demand banking institutions to submit according to regulations balance sheets of
their assets, statements of profit and loss and other financial and accounting reports and data").
123. Id. art. 30.
124. Id. arts. 41-50 (the articles list the crimes punishable by fines and jail time. Specifically,
articles 41-46 pertain to the activity of counterfeit, while articles 47-50 involve the crime of em-
bezzlement and bribes).
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ous infractions. For example, the PBOC might consider the conse-
quences of a commercial bank's failure to provide requested
documents in time. Under such scenario, the PBOC would benefit
from the authority to impose a fine for each day the documents are
not delivered. Ultimately, if a commercial bank repeatedly fails to
comply with PBOC regulations, the PBOC should have the ability to
revoke their banking license.
The enforcement mechanisms will have a two-fold purpose. First, it
will provide the PBOC with the needed mechanism to enforce rules
and regulations. Secondly, banks will have an added incentive to com-
ply with PBOC regulations. The culmination of the two purposes will
not only legitimize the PBOC as an independent body, entrusted with
enforcement of its own policies, but also increase the confidence of
banking consumers. Specifically, consumers can trust their commer-
cial banks to have complied with stringent PBOC standards.
Following the increased confidence, consumers in China will be
more willing to try other banking products. Of course, the preceding
analysis presupposes the autonomy of the PBOC. The importance of
PBOC's autonomy cannot be overly stressed. For commercial banks
to obtain consumer confidence, the PBOC must first be entrusted by
the public as an entity that is independent from government influence.
Providing the PBOC with enforcement mechanisms and freedom
from career politicians will assist the central bank in achieving that
public trust.
3. Regulation and Compliance within the framework of the WTO
Clearly, China's internal banking laws must first be liberalized in
order for foreign commercial banks to fairly compete with Chinese
commercial banks. One major concern of critics opposed to China's
accession to the WTO involves China's willingness to follow interna-
tional agreements. Why if China chooses not to liberalize its banking
sector within the timeframe agreed to between the United States and
China? What courses of action will the United States, and other
member states, have in dealing with China? The next part of the pa-
per will discuss the course of action available through the WTO.
One interesting aspect of the WTO is the existence of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU), a resolution body that settles dis-
putes between member states. 125 Indeed, the WTO utilizes its inde-
125. See Hudec, supra note 21 (showing statistics which suggest that US and other European
countries are using WTO's DSU more often then the dispute resolution mechanism under
GATT. However, more developing countries are becoming defendants under the WTO regime,
compared to the regime established under GATT).
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pendent body, through the DSU to resolve member disputes. 126 The
DSU essentially "establishes. . .a legal system that functions very
much like an international court. Moreover, it is a system that effi-
ciently administers justice. Its combination of short deadlines, quasi-
automatic procedures, and authority to issue binding decisions are
qualities that are relatively unique among international forums for set-
tling disputes."'127
Although international banks will not have the standing to lodge a
compliant against China, it can pressure its own governments to com-
plain on their behalf.128 Such methods will essentially bypass the
standing requirement established by the WTO.129 Nonetheless, pres-
sure from individual commercial banks-and bank groups-will be nec-
essary. Specifically if China's banking liberalization does not conform
to their bilateral agreements then foreign banks, doing business in
China, must inform their governments of the situation. Essentially,
this places banks in the role of regulators of China's commitment in
liberalizing their banking industry.
4. China's Willingness to Comply with International Norms:
Case Study
The concept of liberalization in China's banking sector seems ab-
stract at first glance. Indeed, whether the Chinese leadership will ac-
tually enforce its banking laws and abide by its WTO commitments
remains unclear. Initial analysis, however, suggests that the Chinese
government is fully committed to liberalizing its industries.130 Indeed,
Chinese leadership must embrace other nation-states to ensure for-
eign investment, and secure the success of its WTO membership.' 31
Domestically, China must take steps to guarantee an open environ-
ment for business transactions. Of course, corruption must be ad-
dressed by the banking sector.
126. Movsesian, supra note 22 (providing the history of the dispute resolution procedure that
emerged from GATF). See also Peng supra note 12, at *4 (explaining the procedure of the
dispute resolution procedure within the context of Chinese culture).
127. Van Der Borght, supra note 23 (reviewing DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MARVROIDIS,
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1999)).
128. See Philip M. Nichols, Two Snowflakes are Alike: Assumptions Made in the Debate Over
Standing Before World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Boards, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
427 (2000) (explaining that only "member polities" of the WTO has standing before the dispute
settlement boards).
129. Id.
130. See Paul Mooney, Beijing's Latest Look, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 2002, at 44 (stating that
China will continue to make good impressions to obtain benefits from its WTO acceptance).
131. Id.
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Recently, the banking industry faced a scandal involving one of the
four largest Chinese commercial banks. The Bank of China, the coun-
try's second-largest bank, and Wang Xuebing (head of the bank),
were implicated in a lending scheme in which Wang loaned $23 mil-
lion to his wife. 132 Under the Commercial Banking Law 133 Mr.
Wang's loans, which became defaulted and contained insufficient col-
lateral, amounted to an illegal transaction under Chinese law. Fearing
a more widespread epidemic, the PBOC censured all of the Big Four
banks and punished 686 members for various infractions. 134
Although such measures seem severe, corruption in the state-owed
banks are by no means isolated. Indeed, in another recent example,
several high-ranking bank managers stole $480 million dollars from a
Bank of China branch. 35 Interestingly, corruption the Commercial
Banking Law addresses corruption. 136 Anticipating the temptations
inherently involved in the banking sector, Article 27 prohibits certain
individuals from holding "high managerial positions." 137
Although safeguards in place failed to prevent corruption in certain
instances it shows the PBOC, along with the Chinese leadership's,
willingness to pursue high-level corruptors. Thus, the existence of cor-
ruption becomes a secondary issue. International members, especially
132. See Mark L. Clifford, Alysha Webb, Dexter Roberts & Petti Fong, Banks Under a Cloud:
Scandal at Bank of China Highlights Questions About China's Big Four, Bus. WK., Jan. 28, 2002,
at 52.
133. See COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW art. 40 (1995) (China) (stating that "a commercial bank
shall not extend unsecured loans to individuals connected to the bank; and shall not provide such
individuals with secured loans with conditions more favorable than those offered to a borrower
of a similar loan with no such connections." The provision defines "related persons" as "mem-
bers of the Board of Directors . . .managerial personnel and staff ... and the close relatives
thereof .. ")(emphasis added).
134. See Clifford et al., supra note 132.
135. Id. (The accused bank managers were believed to have stole the money from a
Guangdong branch between 1992 and 2001. According to various sources, three of the managers
involved have escaped to Canada).
136. See COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW art. 27 (1995) (China).
137. Id. Article 27 states:
Individuals who have been in one of the following circumstances shall not hold high
managerial positions in a commercial bank.
(1) sentenced to imprisonment or deprived of political rights on account of graft, brib-
ery, illegal possession of property, embezzlement of public property or disruption
of social economic order;
(2) served as a director on a Board of Directors, or as the director or manager, of a
company which went bankrupt because of mismanagement, and having been per-
sonally responsible for the bankruptcy;
(3) acted as the legal representative of a company whose business license had been
revoked on account of violation of the law and having been personally responsible
therefore;
(4) failed to repay a fairly large debt which had become due).
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members of the WTO, should breathe a sigh of relief. This case not
only suggests China's ability to combat corruption, but also of its ac-
ceptance of international rules.
5. Quanxi in China
One variable, which could influence China's liberalization strategy,
involves its cultural inclination to employ quanxi in business deal-
ings.138 Whereas the PBOC is willing to pursue corruption cases, their
willingness to end cultural norms seems uncertain. Such hesitation
stems from the fine line drawn between a favor and an illegal act. For
example, whereas making an unjustified loan to a spouse would be
illegal, speeding up the loan process for a qualified friend would be
legitimate.
Small favors are conducted everyday, and cross all borders. How-
ever, in China, the use of quanxi could hinder its aspiration for speedy
banking liberalization. While quanxi could be employed to assist
some banks, it could also be utilized to hinder other banks. For exam-
ple, instead of fully opening the banking sector to all qualified com-
mercial banks, the PBOC could speed up banking licenses to those
banks whom have quanxi with the PBOC staff. It is equally probable
that the PBOC could unduly delay issuing a banking license to a com-
mercial bank that will directly compete with an existing commercial
bank.
To avoid such blatant favoritism, the PBOC will have to treat each
applicant objectively. Here, the Standing Committee must maintain
its role as an enforcer. It must make sure that PBOC's actions are
justified and fair, and any discrepancies are clearly and immediately
explained. Additionally, clear guidelines must be promulgated by the
Standing Committee. The guidelines should establish PBOC's role in
various central bank transactions. Most importantly, all decisions
must remain transparent to the international community.
V. IMPACT FOR FUTURE US-CHINA RELATIONS
China's accession to the WTO will have important implications for
the United States and China's relations. 139 Commentators argue that
the United States will loose an important bargaining chip since it can
no longer review the PNTR of China. These critics argue that the US
138. See Peng, supra note 12.
139. Since China's entry into the WTO in November 2001, China has lowered tariffs and
made regulations more transparent. See Keith Bradsher, U.S. Official Cites Progress in Trade
Ties with China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, available at http:lwww.nytimes.com/2003/02/20/inter
nationallasia/20CHIN.html (quoting Robert Zoellick, a United States trade representative).
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should continue to "police" China using the PNTR as incentive for
compliance. During President Clinton's term, he decided to stop us-
ing the PNTR as the pretext of addressing the issue of human
rights. 140 Instead, PNTR became granted solely on the basis of eco-
nomic benefits and factors. This approach ultimately led to the suc-
cessful negotiation between the US and China regarding its accession
to the WTO.
One major concern for critics opposed to China's accession to the
WTO was the lack of control the United States would have over
China. Specifically, the United States will loose its bargaining chip
over economic issues in China. These fears are unfounded. Instead,
the United States could ensure China's compliance with economic
standards and liberalization policies agreed by the parties. The
United States will ultimately utilize the DSU to monitor and regulate
China's liberalization progress. Indeed, the DSU should prove to be a
better mechanism then the PNTR. Aside from international legiti-
macy, the US will also obtain international support should China fail
to liberalize according to its WTO commitments.
One important question remains, what role will legal practitioners
have in post-WTO China? Legal experts 141 must become familiar
with the relevant banking laws promulgated by the PBOC. These ex-
perts must inform and pressure the PBOC to clarify ambiguous rules
and regulations. Obtaining legal knowledge is only the first step in
becoming a practitioner in China. A legal expert must also indoctri-
nate herself with cultural nuances that exist in China. Additionally,
the tradition of quanxi must be recognized by any successful practi-
tioner. Foreign practitioners in China cannot isolate themselves from
domestic practitioners and agencies. Instead, relationships must be
forged and various practices disseminated.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately the liberalization and internationalization of China's
banking sector will prove to be beneficial for all. China, for its part,
will have the necessary catalyst, its entry into the WTO, to make sure
that their banks are efficient and able to compete with foreign banks.
In return, billions of Chinese citizens will have access to competitive
and innovative banking products. By the same token, foreign firms
140. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Normal Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 44 (providing the background to China and United States' history involving the most
favored nation status and its role in human rights).
141. With China's accession to the WTO, the legal environment will also begin to open up to
foreign practitioners.
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will finally be able to penetrate the Chinese market and access its
huge consumer base. In the end, China's WTO membership should
prove to be a win-win situation.

